İSKENDER KARAKAYA’NIN ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANALİZLERİ

After 9/11 2001, Changing Security Policy and Perceptions of United States of America: “Bush Doctrine” and differences between the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2006 National Security Strategy Documents (NSS)

Introduction

11 September 2001 terrorist attack has changed many things in the world. Not only USA and its people but also other countries people and its policy makers had believed that USA and its technologic supremacy hadn’t been defeated. But while terrorists with two planes were crashing the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers and Pentagon they were changing the perceptions of terrorist attacks, known by a lot of states.

In this article I aimed to answer some questions. With George W. Bush’s Presidentship, USA faced new threats and entered the new term in its foreign policy. After 11 September 2001, USA has declared two National Security Strategies. In this paper, I will evaluate and discuss these strategies. I will try to determine differences and similarities between them. Finally, I am going to conclude my evaluation according to realities of USA National Security Strategies (NSS).

I) War on Terrorism:

When Second Bush Term comes, in his letter introducing the 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA, President Bush begins portentously (and controversially): “America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: “to protect the security of the American people” (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2002:2)

President Bush is clearly writing not of any traditional inter- State war, but rather of what he has called the ongoing “war on terror”, or as the Pentagon has more recently called it, the “long war”. The assertion that there is an ongoing war leads the President to repeat the controversial legal claims on the use of force made earlier in the 2002 National Security Strategy, and in particular to a reaffirmation of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense. (JERVİS, 2005:37) This article will consider whether the 2006 National Security Strategy adds anything to its predecessor as regards the use of force. Does it develop the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence? How does the USA apply the law of self-defence to attacks by and against non-State actors in the war on terror?

In May 2003, the USA had announced that major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was over, but that the war on terror continued. U.S. Defence Secretary Rumsfeld proclaimed that major combat operations in Afghanistan were over, following the overthrow of the Taliban regime which had supported Al-Qaida terrorists; Operation Enduring Freedom had been initiated in October 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.(GRAY, 2003:64)

President Bush proclaimed that major combat operations in Iraq were over after the toppling of Saddam Hussein. With regard to Iraq, President Bush asserted that “The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September 11, 2001 and still goes on… The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We’ve removed an ally of Al-Qaida and cut off a source of terrorist funding”. (HOFMANN, 2006:95) This is a renewal of his earlier controversial attempts to establish a link between the regime of Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaida terrorists. In the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush administration claimed that these links existed, in an attempt to justify the use of force against Iraq as part of the war on terror. But no evidence for the existence of such a link was produced before the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

II) The promotion of freedom

As we have seen, a major focus of President Bush’s letter introducing the 2006 National Security Strategy was the war on terror. However, in his introductory letter, President Bush also went on to stress the “promotion of freedom”: “America also has an unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace. The ideals that have inspired our history—freedom, democracy, and human dignity—are increasingly inspiring individuals and nations throughout the world. And because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure”. (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:2)

In the 2006 National Security Strategy when it said that “The form that freedom and democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to its people”. The tactics of the USA in its support of the “advocates of freedom” will vary, reflecting where each government is on the path from freedom to tyranny.(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:22)

III) The National Security Strategy and Pre-Emptive Self-Defence

A) Backround: 2002 National Security Strategy

The 2006 National Security Strategy largely reaffirms the 2002 National Security Strategy and repeatedly refers back to its provisions on the use of force and other topics. Almost every section of the 2006 Strategy begins with a summary of the equivalent section of the 2002 Strategy.

The 2002 National Security Strategy was a dramatic document which provoked much discussion. It was intended to address the need to transform the defence of the nation in response to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new threats from terrorist attacks following 9/11.(PILLAR, 2003:67)

Its most important feature as regards international law on the use of force was its support for a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence: “The USA has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security . . . To forestall or prevent . . . hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively”.(FRASER, 2005:98) In this context, it suggested a fundamental change in the law on the use of force, in particular on the scope of self-defence. It called for a re-examination of the requirement of imminence in the law of self-defence. It said international law recognized that the use of force against imminent attack was permissible, and went on “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries”.(THE WHİTE HOUSE, 2002:15) Thus, the 2002 Strategy did refer expressly, but very briefly—and controversially— to international law, in claiming that, for centuries, international law had recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they could lawfully take action to defend themselves.

B) Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003

The 2002 US National Security Strategy was produced after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and after the USA had undertaken Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in response to those attacks. However, it was obviously written with special regard to Iraq when it described the threat posed by rogue regimes which might acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and supply them to global terrorists hostile to the USA and its friends. It is widely acknowledged that Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the danger of pre-emptive action. (AREND, 2008:95)

The Iraq Survey Group set up by the coalition forces after the invasion provided final confirmation of this in October 2004: “after some 1500 inspectors had spent 16 months and US$6000 million scouring the cities and deserts of Iraq, they had found no WMD or any programmes to manufacture them”. The Iraq Survey Group did, however, assert that Saddam Hussein had intended to develop such weapons. The debate continues as to whether it was faulty intelligence or misuse of intelligence involving the politicization of the intelligence services by governments, or both, that led to the assertion the Saddam Hussein was developing WMD and to the decision to use force. President Bush acknowledged in the 2006 National Security Strategy., “Our intelligence must improve”.(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:29)

However, he said there would always be some uncertainty about the status of hidden programmes, since proliferators are often brutal regimes that go to great lengths to conceal their activities. And Saddam’s strategy of bluff, denial and deception is a dangerous game that dictators play at their peril. It was Saddam’s reckless behavior that demanded the world’s attention, and it was his refusal to remove the ambiguity he created that forced the United States and its allies to act. “We have no doubt that the world is a better place for the removal of this dangerous and unpredictable tyrant, and we have no doubt that the world is better off if tyrants know that they pursue WMD at their own peril”.(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:5)

C) Pre-Emptive self-defence in the 2006 National Security Strategy

In his letter introducing the 2006 Strategy, President Bush says, “We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country”, and the 2006 National Security Strategy makes a continuing strong commitment to pre-emptive action. It asserts that “The place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same”.(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:23)

The 2006 Strategy repeats the 2002 position that in fighting terrorism, the USA can no longer rely on deterrence; the fight must be taken to the enemy. However, the 2006 National Security Strategy no longer refers merely to the threat posed by “shadowy networks of individuals” as President Bush’s introduction to the 2002 version had done; it now attempts to identify much more precisely the nature of the terrorist threat. The main danger is said to come from “Islamic extremists”, although the Strategy nevertheless maintains that “the war on terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of religions”. (FUKUYAMA, 2007:18) It discusses the causes of terrorism at some length and contests the view that the invasion and occupation of Iraq led to an increase in terrorism.

President Bush has attributed a clear three-step political agenda to “Islamic extremists” or “Islamo-fascists”. First, they want to end American influence in the Middle East because the USA stands for democracy and peace; second, they want to use the vacuum created by an American retreat to gain control of a country, a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war against non-radical Muslim governments; and third, they believe that controlling one country will rally the Muslim masses, enabling them to overthrow all moderate governments in the region and establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia.

On the other hand, not only is there no mention of international law on the law of force, but also there is almost any reference to the UN in the 2006 Strategy. As in the 2002 Strategy, there is no recognition of the primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.

D) Rogue States – 2002 and 2006

In 2002, the Strategy identified the most serious challenges to US national security as emanating from the dual threat of rogue States developing WMD and of terrorists who might acquire such weapons. It singled out Iraq and North Korea, and said “We must be prepared to stop rogue States and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends”(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2002:14).

In the 2006 Strategy, the focus shifts to Iran and Syria as State sponsors of terror: “Some states such as Syria and Iran continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad”. (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:9) In the context of proliferation of WMD, the Strategy singles out Iran again: “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran”. This is not only because of its attempts to develop nuclear weapons, but also because of broader concerns. “The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom”.

IV) Humanitarian Intervention and the 2006 Security

As was mentioned earlier, a major focus of the 2006 US National Security Strategy is on democracy and its power to transform. Does this stress on the “promotion of freedom” lead the USA to call for pro-democratic invasion, regime change or humanitarian intervention?

The USA certainly does not expressly support the use of force to implement democracy in the Strategy. It spells out at length the tools at the disposal of the USA to end tyranny and promote effective democracy, but it does not include in this list any right to use force for these ends. This is a further indication that the USA, despite its willingness to call for regime change in States such as Afghanistan and Iraq, does not wish openly to espouse any doctrine of pro-democratic invasion.(NEACK, 2003:101)

The 2005 UN World Summit had accepted a doctrine of a “responsibility to protect” in its final Outcome Document, this doctrine proved more appealing to States than the earlier doctrine of humanitarian intervention had been. It is significant that the USA says very little on this issue in its 2006 National Security Strategy. Even though it has accepted that States without effective government pose a threat in the context of the war on terror, the USA in the 2006 National Security Strategy does not openly espouse the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” in cases of humanitarian crisis.

VI) The use of force against non-State actors and the 2006 Strategy

The focus on the war on terror in the 2006 Strategy necessarily raises the issue of the current state of the law on the use of force by and against non-State actors. The Strategy says that the need for action on WMD requires new approaches: both offences and defences are “necessary to deter State and non-State actors, through denial of the objectives of their attacks and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force”. In the 2006 Strategy, the USA and its allies in the war on terror make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor them, because they are equally guilty of murder. (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:22)

Conclusion

After 11 September 2001, the terrorist attacks have changed many things in the world. In this article, it has been aimed that what are the differences between 2002 and 2006 American National Security Documents. With Bush Era, USA has implemented “unilateral actions” policies than “co-operation” policies. In 2002 NSS Document, USA has declared “war on terrorism” to protect the security of the American people. George Bush said “it will be long-war”, and the time or eight years administration, justified him. Because so-called “Bush Doctrine” brought the world, only “war, terrorism and security anxieties”. In other words, with 2002 NSS, the world has seen “pre-emptive strike doctrine, Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, rogue states term etc”

The 2006 NSS in a way largely recognition the 2002 NSS and repeatedly refers back to its provisions on the use of force and other topics as I mentioned above. When 2006 NSS Document was declared, USA priorities focused on “Iran and Syria” as sponsorship of terrorism. Especially Irak was identified as a terrorist state that it the Iranian regime sponsors terrorism and also threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; At the same time disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom.

Finally, In George W. Bush’s eight years administration, both USA and the world face new threats and new problems. But namely, we have seen and tested that the world would be different than the cold war period.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

COX, Michael and STOKE, Doug (2008), US Foreign Policy,(Oxford: Oxford University Press)

GADDIS, John Lewis (2005), Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press)

FRASER, Cameron (2005), US foreign policy after the Cold War: global hegemony or reluctant sheriff? , (London: Routledge)

F. HOGE Jr, James and ROSE, Gideon (2003), American foreign policy: cases and choices, (New York: Council of Foreign Affairs)

GRAY, Christine (2003), International Law and Use of Force, (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

GRAY, Christine (2002), “The U.S. National Security Strategy and the new Bush Doctrine on Pre-Emptive Self-defence, (Chinese JIL, vol.3, s.437)

HOFMANN, Stanley (2006), Chaos and violence: what globalization, failed states, and terrorism mean for U.S. foreign policy, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield)

JERVİS, Robert (2005) American foreign policy in a new era, (New York: Routledge)

KALICKI, Jan H. and GOLDWYN, David L. (2005), Energy and Security: Toward a new foreign policy strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press)

, Laura (2003), The new foreign policy: U.S. and comparative foreign policy in the 21st century, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield)

PILLAR, Paul R.(2003), Terrorism and U.S. foreign policy, (Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution Press)

Articles

Arend, Anthony Clark, “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2003), s. 89–103.

Asmus, Ronald and Larry Diamond, “A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 2005), s. 7–21.

Biddle, Stephan and Pollack Kenneth M., “How to Leave s Stable Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5 (Sep-Oct 2008), s. 40–58.

Campbell, Kurt M. and Steinberg, James B., “Managing Foreign Policy and National Security Challenges in Presidential Transitions,” , The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Autumn 2008), s. 7–20.

Desch, Michael C., “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3(May-Jun 2007), s.97–108.

Dobbins, James, “Who Lost Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5 (Sep-Oct 2007), s. 61–74.

Dory, Amanda J. “American Civil Security The U.S. Public and Homeland Security,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter 2004), s. 37–52.

Drezner, Daniel W., “The New ‘New World Order,’” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Mar-Apr 2007), s. 34–46.

Freedman, Lawrence, “Prevention, Not Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2003), s. 105–114.

Fukuyama, Francis and Michael McFaul, “Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter 2007), s. 23–45.

Gordon, Phillip H., “Can the War on Terror Be Won,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2007), s. 53–66.

Gordon, Phillip H., “The End of the Bush Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul-Aug 2006), s. 75–86.

Guoliang, Gu, “Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2003), s. 135–145.

Haass, Richard N. “The Age of Non-polarity,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May-Jun 2008), s. 44–56.

Hachigian, Nina and Mona Sutphen, “Strategic Collaboration How the United States Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Autumn 2008), s. 43–57.

Heisbourg, Francois, “A Work in Progress The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2003), s. 75–88.

Jervis, Robert, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 2006), s. 7–19.

Kagan, Robert., “The September 12 Paradigm,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5 (Sep-Oct 2008), s. 25–39.

Leffler, Melvyn P., “Bush’un Dış Politikası,” Foreign Policy (Türkiye Baskısı), 2004.

Lewis, John Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Second Term,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1 ( Jan-Feb 2005), s. 2–15.

Mazarr, Michael J., “The Folly of ‘Asymmetric War’,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 2008), s. 33–53.

McFaul, Michael, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2005), s. 147–163.

Moisi, Dominique, “The Land of Hope Again,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5 (Sep-Oct 2008), s. 140–146.

Nye, Joseph ‘U.S. Security Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century,’ U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, 2003.

Pillar, Paul R., “01 – Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Mar-April 2006), s. 15–27.

Rice, Condoleezza, “Rethinking the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Jul-Aug 2008), s. 2–26.

Richardson, Bill. “New Realism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 2008), s. 142–154.

Rubin, James P., “Building a New Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Jul-Aug 2008), s. 99–110.

Stepanova, Ekaterina, “War and Peace Building,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Autumn 2004), s. 127–136.

THE WHİTE HOUSE, “The National Security Strategy of The United States of America,” September 2002

THE WHİTE HOUSE, “The National Security Strategy of The United States of America,” March 2006

Walt, Stephan M., “Tamin American Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5(Sep-Oct 2005), s. 105–120.

Zakaria, Fareed, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May-Jun 2008), s. 18–43.