Terrorism and Counterterrorism Measures taken by Turkey after 11 September 2001 Mart 8, 2009
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Terrorism and Counterterrorism Measures taken by Turkey after 11 September 2001
After 11 September 2001, the world began to focus more attention on terrorism. At that day, terrorism became the most important issue for “security of states”. The purpose of this article is to focus on terrorism and counterterrorism activities in Turkey.
In Turkey, the terrorist organizations are classified into four groups: a)left-wing groups (DHKP-C, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist Partisan-(TKP-ML(TIKKO)), b) right-wing group(Hezbollah), c) separatist groups(PKK) and d) Al-Qaeda connected terrorist groups.
As indicated in “Europe Union Terrorist List May 2006”, there have been three active major terrorist groups in Turkey. Their names are Great Eastern Islamic Riders (IBDA-C, İslami Büyükdoğu Akıncılar Cephesi), Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK, Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) and Revolutionary People’s Liberation-Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi).
In this article, it will be discussed these terrorist groups structures. There are main eight questions to answer. They will be answered towards questions and they will also be identified these terrorist groups features. In addition to answering questions, it will be given some statistics, numbers and sources.
A) What terrorist groups have you been active in your country? Who are/were the members of these groups?
As above mentioned, there are three major terrorist groups in Turkey. They are PKK, IBDA-C and DHKP-C. They are also the most known terrorist groups among the people. Now, they will be given information about all of them and singly.
PKK has founded 1970s. PKK’s operational period has started since 1978. Its members are some complicated for thirty-eight years. PKK has been supported fairly among the Kurdish Population in Turkey. As indicated in statistics about PKK members profile shows us that 54% of the members are aged 14 to 25, 34% 26 to 37 and 12% 38 to 58. University graduates make up 11 % of the members, high school graduates 16 %, secondary school graduates 13 %, primary school graduates 39%, literate non-graduates 12% and illiterates 9%.
IBDA-C has founded 1970. It has gone to the violence in 1990s by its leader Salih Mirzabeyoğlu. The precise number of the IBDA-C’s members is unknown yet. However, reliable sources estimate its membership to be around 100 cadres.
As indicated in statistics about IBDA-C, 2,5 % of the members are aged 10 to 14, 72,5 % 15 to 24, 17 % 25 to 29, 6 % 30 to 34 and 2 % 35 to 64. University graduates make up 22,5 % of the members, high school graduates 40 %, secondary school graduates 14 %, primary school graduates 19 %, literate non-graduates % 2,5 and illiterates 1,5%.
DHKP-C is Marxist and Leninist Party in the Turkey. There are many members in Turkey and Europe. It uses guerilla tactics of Cuba’s Fidel Castro. According to official report, 65 % of the members are aged 14 to 25, 16,8 % are 25 to 30 and 17,5 % are older than 30. University graduates make up 20,4 % of the members, high school graduates 33,5 %, secondary school graduates 14 %, primary school graduates 29,9 % and illiterates 1,9 %.
B) What goals have the respective terrorist groups tried to achieve? Have they changed over the time? Why?
PKK’s main goals have been to create independent and socialist Kurdish State in Kurdistan; Kurdistan means that, a geographical region that comprises parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran, where the Kurdish population is the majority. After 11 September 2001, PKK has changed its strategy. After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of PKK), PKK’s tactic “conventional fighting” move to “improvised explosive devices” rather than direct confrontation.
Following to capture of Öcalan, (1999 – ) the organization announced “peace initiative” and used “cultural and human rights idiom”. The organizations hard-line militant group took control and renounced the self-imposed ceasefire with the turn of 2004.
IBDA-C’s main goal is to create a “Sunni Islamic Federate State in Middle East” and re-establish the Caliphate. They are especially enemy to Shia, Alevi, Christian and Jewish interests. IBDA-C wishes to destroy Turkey’s secular and constitutional system and replace it with religious state, first in Turkey and then throughout the world. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was a great poet and thinker who lived in Turkey, is a source of thought of IBDA-C doctrine with his “pure Islamic values” idea. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was seen as the pioneer of “ideal Islamic society” by the founders of IBDA-C.
DHKP-C adopts a Marxist and Leninist ideology and holds anti-US and anti-NATO positions. They think that Turkish government is under the control of Western imperialism and seeks to destroy and escape from it. The current agenda of the DHKP-C(after 11 September 2001) have focused on USA occupation in Iraq, and the abolition of one – to three man prison cells, called F-Types. The prisons are part of an effort by the Turkish authorities to reduce the problems caused by holding a large number prisoner convicted of terrorism or organized crime in dormitory style prisons.
C) How much popular support have the terrorist groups enjoyed? Has it fluctuated over time? What domestic political socio-economic and other factors appear to be/had been conducive to the recruitment by the terrorist group?
PKK has a great support among the Kurdish People in Turkey. Its ideology claims to generate equality of gender. The organization increased its number of members through the recruitment of women from different social structures and environments, such as women from families that migrated to several European countries after 1960 as guest workers.
The organization used the children as a military force within its army. When asked why the children stayed in the organization, two thirds stated that they were afraid of being caught as reprisals are not just limited to physical harm towards the militant; their families would be at risk as well. Five percent said that it was from fear of punishment by the Republic of Turkey.
PKK has had party groups such as HEP/HADEP/DEHAP/DTP. On the other hand, PKK perceived Turkish society as one that deformed by capitalism and imperialism. It is based on both political and socio-economic factors. The PKK unleashed its aggression on enemies spanning all classes (farmers, business, etc.) and those that it considered puppets of the state. There are poor life conditions in Kurdish Area in southeastern Turkey.
IBDA-C is proving support from non-secular environments (especially who supports Islamic state approach) who are against the constitutional and secular state system of Turkey. According to IBDA-C thinkers, Turkish regime is collaborating with West. After 11 September 2001, there are many domestic socio-politics factors to recruit by the terrorist group. One of them, IBDA-C identifies itself as a protecting Islam (like Al-Qaida in international arena). So, the organization also produces propagandist literature put out in bookstores and on the internet, which has the potential to attract new members, including those from other countries. IBDA-C is attacking to especially churches, charities, minority-affiliated targets, TV transmitters, newspapers, pro-secular journalists, Ataturk statues, taverns, banks, clubs, and tobacco shops, tradesmen to intimidate the civil people and to find finance for the organization.
. IBDA-C had claimed responsibility for the dual synagogue bombing in Istanbul on November 15, 2003, which killed 24 and injured 255, as well as subsequent attack on the HSBC Bank and British Consulate on 20 November 2003. But there was also claim about joint bombing attack with Al-Qaida network.
DHKP-C is providing support among the people both who has a Marxist ideology and who against USA and West policies. In 1994, the organization was separated two parts. The main group led by Dursun Karataş and named DHKP-C, after that time, DHKP-C has been changed up to now in its actions. During the 1990s years, DHKP-C attacked towards U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. In 1996, the group assassinated Özdemir Sabancı, o prominent Turkish businessman and two others. Since 2001, the group had started to use suicide bombings. In addition, the group has deployed improvised explosive device against the Turkish police and military targets
D) How have the terrorist groups financed their operations and activities?
PKK has a big budget as estimated nearly 500 million Euros. PKK has been collecting money from its members such as private donations, both individuals and organizations contributions, Kurdish businessmen’s aids from southeastern Turkey, through the sale of various publications etc.
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) also has been financing its separatist movement by extorting narcotics traffickers and engaging in the trade themselves. French law enforcement estimates that the PKK smuggles 80% of the heroin in Paris the British Foreign Office has made a similar estimate for Britain. PKK has also earning money from commercial activities and donations.
IBDA-C does not have many followers, despite the organization’s high profile. Many of its actions are carried out for the sole purpose of enhancing its image as a power to be reckoned with. So, IBDA-C hasn’t got a big budget. But it can provide money from its sympathizers especially in Europe. It has also incomes from such as oblation skins income (in Religion Kurban Bayram etc.),
DHKP-C has many finance sources with different ways. For instances, seizing and theft, membership free to society, ransom, extortion, publications incomes, commercial activities, forgery, human trade, narcotic smuggling.
E) Have any terrorist groups in your country benefited from foreign support? Any the evidence of linkages to international terrorist networks?
PKK received many supports from many countries. 1979–1999, PKK has taken support from Syria strongly. After the undeclared war between Turkey and Syria (1999), Syria placed restrictions on PKK activities on its soil. Turkey is expecting positive developments in its cooperation with Syria in the long term. After 2001, Syria and Turkey agreed to fight against PKK together in their lands.
Support from Iran for PKK is cut when the PKK forces of Iran (PEJAK) attacked the Iranian forces. Iran has put PKK names in terrorist organization list. After 2001, Iran and Turkey collaborated against PKK forces. Support from Greece, During the Cold War period was strong. Greece supplied to PKK, training camps and rebels.
Support from Soviet Union, According to one speculation, Abdullah Öcalan was trained in Soviet Union. Now, after 2001, Russia hasn’t put PKK’s name as a terrorist organization in the list of terrorist groups yet.
Support from U.K, there has been T.V. broadcasting for five years. Until, its license was revoked by the regulators Independent Television Commission (ITC) in 1999 due to a breach of ITC guidelines and perceived pro-PKK bias. In December 2008, U.K. detained some members of PKK and seized assets of PKK’s man in Britain, Selman Bozkur. Support from various E.U. States, They have given the permission to use their broadcasting frequency by PKK such as MEDYA TV(Belgium), ROJ TV(Denmark), etc.
On the other hand, some of PKK leaders lived and moved freely such as Hıdır Yalçın, Rıza Altun, Zübeyir Aydar, and Ali Haydar Kaytan in Europe Countries. Even they were wanted by Interpol, they could have gone move freely.
According to some debates (coming from especially “Turkish Think Thanks” and American Journalist Seymour Hersh), in 2007, was claimed that U.S. supported PJAK which knows Iran’s PKK forces, to use it against Iran’s Army at the north-western Iran. It was clandestine war.
IBDA-C has many supports in Europe. Especially in Germany, the organization has almost 600 supporters. It has also some supporters in Western Europe Countries. Even IBDA-C and Al-Qaida have similar aims and structures there is no real evidence on cooperation between them.
F) What kind of counterterrorism measures has the national government adopted? Have they changed over time? Why?
Before giving information about counterterrorism measures of Turkey, it must be explained and identified “Turkish National Police and Counter-Terrorism Structure”.
In Turkey, counterterrorism activities are overseen by the Ministry of Interior. Under the Ministry of Interior, there are two major entities that responsible for anti-terrorism tasks: “Turkish National Police” and “gendarmerie”. Police are responsible for urban areas and gendarmerie is responsible for rural areas. There is also the National Intelligence Agency (MIT – Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı) which has some authorities along with Intelligence Service within Turkish National Police (TNP).
About counter-terrorism, there are three departments in TNP which are responsible for responding the terrorism. They are mainly Intelligence Department, Special Operations Department and Anti-Terrorism Department. These departments are organized based on two structures. First unit is the headquarters within TNP in Ankara. Second structure is the counterpart divisions in cities and districts.
Counter Terrorism Strategies in Turkey
Turkey has used a variety innovative approach to combat terrorism. “Diplomacy” and “Addressing the cause of terrorism” are most important elements of counter-terrorism strategies in Turkey.
Diplomacy
Turkish diplomacy about counter-terrorism case mostly has bilateral relations. On Syria case against the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan’s existence in there, Turkey put into practiced a good example of efficient diplomacy towards Syria.
In fact, one of the major challenges for the Turkish government is to live up to the growing demand for the leadership form and maintain an active international coalition. Turkey suffers from lack of support and sensitivity even from NATO members such as Belgium. For instance, Belgium court refused to extradite Fehriye Erdal, a member of DHKP-C terrorist organization and one of the individuals who assassinated Özdemir Sabancı, was prominent businessman in Turkey.
Addressing the Cause of Terrorism
Turkey has also sought to undermine the sources of terrorism. Especially, it has some problems in southeast part of Turkey. To gain additional support, PKK has been exaggerating the so-called discrimination against the Kurdish population and prohibition of Kurdish language in there.
As a response concerning these allegations, Turkish Parliament enacted a “recognizant law for Kurdish language”. At the same time, Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) was started by government and improved to seek the economics and social conditions in the region. Additionally, state provided funds for building some new recreation area, expanding employment opportunities etc.
Terrorist Organizations
PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by a number of states and organizations, including the United States, NATO and the European Union. It is listed as one of the 12 active terrorist organizations in Turkey according to “Counter Terrorism and Operations Department of Turkish Police” in 2007. Turkey labeled the organization as an ethnic secessionist organization that uses terrorism and the threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.
After 2001, there were many counter-terrorist measures, implemented by Turkey Government. In 2003, Turkish government came up with a series of suggestions and policies to deal the final blow to “PKK terrorism”, as it officially known.
The parliament enacted the “Reinstatement into Society Law” (Topluma Kazandırma Yasası) which was similar to the juridical mechanism of “plea bargaining” in that members of terrorist organizations would receive amnesty or a reduction in sentence in exchange for becoming state witnesses.
Turkey’s state has been in a big struggle against the IBDA-C. After, 11 September 2001, IBDA-C has been encountering many events in the “Turkish Politics Life”. So, Turkey applied many counter-terrorism applications. Salih İzzet Erdiş who was known leader, was captured at 1998 and sentenced to death in 2001. Then Erdiş’s death sentence was later changed when Ankara abolished the death penalty in August 2002. In March 2004, when a Turkish court emitted Erdiş a 20-year prison sentence for using handmade explosives and weapons in a riot against authorities at Metris Prison.
Turkey has also had big problem with DHKP-C, during the 2000s years. After 11 September 2001, DHKP-C has added suicide bombings to its operations in 2001 against Turkish Police both in January and September. DHKP/C female suicide bomber Şengül Akkurt’s explosive belt detonated by accident on May 20, 2003 in Ankara, in a restroom, while she was preparing for an action. On 24 July 2004, Semiran Polat of DHKP-C’s member has exploded bomb on a bus in Istanbul and three people have died in there. On July 1, 2005, Eyüp Beyaz of DHKP-C’s member was killed in Ankara. He attempted to suicide bombing attack in front of the Ministry of Justice.
G) Which counterterrorism worked best? What did not work? Why?
There have been many good-counterterrorism measures, implemented by Turkey government. Some of them worked efficiently and also some of them didn’t work effectively.
First of all, on the one hand after applying “Reinstatement into Society Law” in 2003, the government of Turkey got advantages against PKK, many terrorists who were in the mountains and other countries (especially Iraq and Iran borders) surrendered to Turkish Police, Gendarmerie and Army.
On the other hand Turkish Army has attacked PKK targets in Turkey-Iraq Border in Northern Iraq Region twice in 2007 and 2008. So, a lot of bases of PKK in Northern Iraq, has been destroyed.
Secondly, Turkish Police has started to serious struggle against IBDA-C members and organization itself. The Capturing of Erdiş, who was leader of IBDA-C, strokes the organizations structure and ability of action. In the latest period, DHKP-C couldn’t have done prominent action in Turkey.
Thirdly, Turkish Police has pursued big struggle against the members of DHKP-C in recent years. A lot of members of DHKP-C have been arrested by the Turkish Police. Since 2001, terrorism has been come the most important subject in the world by the USA, Turkey was also improved their counterterrorism skills against the terrorism.
H) To what extend has international cooperation facilitated the fight against terrorism in your country? Has the European Union made any contributions?
Turkey and Europe Union have bilateral relations against international terrorism. They improved operational engagement and exchange of intelligence evidence. According to “Turkey-EU Strategic Partnership 2007/2008 Report” They enhanced co-operation on the terrorist threat posed by PKK/KONGRA-GEL, particularly it activities in EU area, including terrorist financing and propaganda, in accordance with UNSCRs 1373, 1624 and 1566. They have also enhanced cooperation on the threat from Al-Qaida and other associated extremist groups. Turkey and Europe Union improved mutual understanding of crime and the harm both Turkey and EU.
On the other hand, Turkey’s long effort to combat terrorism has produced many benefits for itself. Additionally, these benefits could be transferred to international community easily.
Firstly, Turkish law enforcement agencies have gathered intelligence wide variety of groups and their ideological and tactical characteristics. Turkey, by sharing this knowledge can be invaluable of source of information for on-going and future terrorism-related investigations.
Secondly, Turkish law enforcement agencies, particularly TNP, have shared this knowledge and experience by training other law enforcement agencies in the region and around the world. More importantly, Turkey could be a bridge for capacity building, transforming global concerns into strategic partnership with a cooperative approach.
SOURCES
Books and Articles
BARNHARDT, Stephan R. (2002), New International Terrorism and Violence Guide, (Manchester: Trafford Publishing)
DENISE, Natalie (2005), Kurds and the state, (New York: Syracuse University Press)
FERHAD, İbrahim, GÜLİSTAN, Gürbey (2000). The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy. (New York, St Martin’s Press)
KATZMAN, Kenneth (1998-08-27). “Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 1998 August 27,“. GlobalSecurity.org.
“Kongra-Gel, KADEK, PKK“. Global Security. Retrieved on 2005–04–01.
OLSON, Robert W. (1996), The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, (Kentucky: University Pres of Kentucky)
ORTTUNG, Robert W., MAKARYCHEV, Andrey(2006), National Counter-Terrorism Strategies(Belgium: IOS Press)
“The Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK)“, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved on 2008–10–09.
“Terrorism, financing of its activities“, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Retrieved on 2008–07–10)
Internet Sources
Turkey EU Strategic Partnership 2007-2008 (2008), http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2007/10/fco_not_251007_turkukstratpart
The Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front(IBDA-C),
http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ibda-c.htm
Türkiye’de Faaliyetlerine Devam Eden Başlıca Terör Örgütleri, http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorgrup1.html
Pike, John (2004–05–21). “Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)”. Federation of American Scientists. http://fas.org/irp/world/para/dev_sol.htm.
Retrieved on 2009–01–07.
Kurdistan Worker’s Party(PKK),
http://fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”. U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/08/103392.htm
Retrieved on 2009–01–07.
Prepared by,
İskender Karakaya,
Erasmus Exchange Program MA Student,
No: 89488475
After 9/11 2001, Changing Security Policy and Perceptions of United States of America Mart 8, 2009
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After 9/11 2001, Changing Security Policy and Perceptions of United States of America: “Bush Doctrine” and differences between the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2006 National Security Strategy Documents (NSS)
Introduction
11 September 2001 terrorist attack has changed many things in the world. Not only USA and its people but also other countries people and its policy makers had believed that USA and its technologic supremacy hadn’t been defeated. But while terrorists with two planes were crashing the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers and Pentagon they were changing the perceptions of terrorist attacks, known by a lot of states.
In this article I aimed to answer some questions. With George W. Bush’s Presidentship, USA faced new threats and entered the new term in its foreign policy. After 11 September 2001, USA has declared two National Security Strategies. In this paper, I will evaluate and discuss these strategies. I will try to determine differences and similarities between them. Finally, I am going to conclude my evaluation according to realities of USA National Security Strategies (NSS).
I) War on Terrorism:
When Second Bush Term comes, in his letter introducing the 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA, President Bush begins portentously (and controversially): “America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: “to protect the security of the American people” (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2002:2)
President Bush is clearly writing not of any traditional inter- State war, but rather of what he has called the ongoing “war on terror”, or as the Pentagon has more recently called it, the “long war”. The assertion that there is an ongoing war leads the President to repeat the controversial legal claims on the use of force made earlier in the 2002 National Security Strategy, and in particular to a reaffirmation of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense. (JERVİS, 2005:37) This article will consider whether the 2006 National Security Strategy adds anything to its predecessor as regards the use of force. Does it develop the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence? How does the USA apply the law of self-defence to attacks by and against non-State actors in the war on terror?
In May 2003, the USA had announced that major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was over, but that the war on terror continued. U.S. Defence Secretary Rumsfeld proclaimed that major combat operations in Afghanistan were over, following the overthrow of the Taliban regime which had supported Al-Qaida terrorists; Operation Enduring Freedom had been initiated in October 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.(GRAY, 2003:64)
President Bush proclaimed that major combat operations in Iraq were over after the toppling of Saddam Hussein. With regard to Iraq, President Bush asserted that “The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September 11, 2001 and still goes on… The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We’ve removed an ally of Al-Qaida and cut off a source of terrorist funding”. (HOFMANN, 2006:95) This is a renewal of his earlier controversial attempts to establish a link between the regime of Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaida terrorists. In the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Bush administration claimed that these links existed, in an attempt to justify the use of force against Iraq as part of the war on terror. But no evidence for the existence of such a link was produced before the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
II) The promotion of freedom
As we have seen, a major focus of President Bush’s letter introducing the 2006 National Security Strategy was the war on terror. However, in his introductory letter, President Bush also went on to stress the “promotion of freedom”: “America also has an unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace. The ideals that have inspired our history—freedom, democracy, and human dignity—are increasingly inspiring individuals and nations throughout the world. And because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure”. (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:2)
In the 2006 National Security Strategy when it said that “The form that freedom and democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to its people”. The tactics of the USA in its support of the “advocates of freedom” will vary, reflecting where each government is on the path from freedom to tyranny.(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:22)
III) The National Security Strategy and Pre-Emptive Self-Defence
A) Backround: 2002 National Security Strategy
The 2006 National Security Strategy largely reaffirms the 2002 National Security Strategy and repeatedly refers back to its provisions on the use of force and other topics. Almost every section of the 2006 Strategy begins with a summary of the equivalent section of the 2002 Strategy.
The 2002 National Security Strategy was a dramatic document which provoked much discussion. It was intended to address the need to transform the defence of the nation in response to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new threats from terrorist attacks following 9/11.(PILLAR, 2003:67)
Its most important feature as regards international law on the use of force was its support for a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence: “The USA has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security . . . To forestall or prevent . . . hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively”.(FRASER, 2005:98) In this context, it suggested a fundamental change in the law on the use of force, in particular on the scope of self-defence. It called for a re-examination of the requirement of imminence in the law of self-defence. It said international law recognized that the use of force against imminent attack was permissible, and went on “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries”.(THE WHİTE HOUSE, 2002:15) Thus, the 2002 Strategy did refer expressly, but very briefly—and controversially— to international law, in claiming that, for centuries, international law had recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they could lawfully take action to defend themselves.
B) Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003
The 2002 US National Security Strategy was produced after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and after the USA had undertaken Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in response to those attacks. However, it was obviously written with special regard to Iraq when it described the threat posed by rogue regimes which might acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and supply them to global terrorists hostile to the USA and its friends. It is widely acknowledged that Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates the danger of pre-emptive action. (AREND, 2008:95)
The Iraq Survey Group set up by the coalition forces after the invasion provided final confirmation of this in October 2004: “after some 1500 inspectors had spent 16 months and US$6000 million scouring the cities and deserts of Iraq, they had found no WMD or any programmes to manufacture them”. The Iraq Survey Group did, however, assert that Saddam Hussein had intended to develop such weapons. The debate continues as to whether it was faulty intelligence or misuse of intelligence involving the politicization of the intelligence services by governments, or both, that led to the assertion the Saddam Hussein was developing WMD and to the decision to use force. President Bush acknowledged in the 2006 National Security Strategy., “Our intelligence must improve”.(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:29)
However, he said there would always be some uncertainty about the status of hidden programmes, since proliferators are often brutal regimes that go to great lengths to conceal their activities. And Saddam’s strategy of bluff, denial and deception is a dangerous game that dictators play at their peril. It was Saddam’s reckless behavior that demanded the world’s attention, and it was his refusal to remove the ambiguity he created that forced the United States and its allies to act. “We have no doubt that the world is a better place for the removal of this dangerous and unpredictable tyrant, and we have no doubt that the world is better off if tyrants know that they pursue WMD at their own peril”.(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:5)
C) Pre-Emptive self-defence in the 2006 National Security Strategy
In his letter introducing the 2006 Strategy, President Bush says, “We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country”, and the 2006 National Security Strategy makes a continuing strong commitment to pre-emptive action. It asserts that “The place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same”.(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:23)
The 2006 Strategy repeats the 2002 position that in fighting terrorism, the USA can no longer rely on deterrence; the fight must be taken to the enemy. However, the 2006 National Security Strategy no longer refers merely to the threat posed by “shadowy networks of individuals” as President Bush’s introduction to the 2002 version had done; it now attempts to identify much more precisely the nature of the terrorist threat. The main danger is said to come from “Islamic extremists”, although the Strategy nevertheless maintains that “the war on terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of religions”. (FUKUYAMA, 2007:18) It discusses the causes of terrorism at some length and contests the view that the invasion and occupation of Iraq led to an increase in terrorism.
President Bush has attributed a clear three-step political agenda to “Islamic extremists” or “Islamo-fascists”. First, they want to end American influence in the Middle East because the USA stands for democracy and peace; second, they want to use the vacuum created by an American retreat to gain control of a country, a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war against non-radical Muslim governments; and third, they believe that controlling one country will rally the Muslim masses, enabling them to overthrow all moderate governments in the region and establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia.
On the other hand, not only is there no mention of international law on the law of force, but also there is almost any reference to the UN in the 2006 Strategy. As in the 2002 Strategy, there is no recognition of the primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.
D) Rogue States – 2002 and 2006
In 2002, the Strategy identified the most serious challenges to US national security as emanating from the dual threat of rogue States developing WMD and of terrorists who might acquire such weapons. It singled out Iraq and North Korea, and said “We must be prepared to stop rogue States and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends”(THE WHITE HOUSE, 2002:14).
In the 2006 Strategy, the focus shifts to Iran and Syria as State sponsors of terror: “Some states such as Syria and Iran continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad”. (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:9) In the context of proliferation of WMD, the Strategy singles out Iran again: “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran”. This is not only because of its attempts to develop nuclear weapons, but also because of broader concerns. “The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom”.
IV) Humanitarian Intervention and the 2006 Security
As was mentioned earlier, a major focus of the 2006 US National Security Strategy is on democracy and its power to transform. Does this stress on the “promotion of freedom” lead the USA to call for pro-democratic invasion, regime change or humanitarian intervention?
The USA certainly does not expressly support the use of force to implement democracy in the Strategy. It spells out at length the tools at the disposal of the USA to end tyranny and promote effective democracy, but it does not include in this list any right to use force for these ends. This is a further indication that the USA, despite its willingness to call for regime change in States such as Afghanistan and Iraq, does not wish openly to espouse any doctrine of pro-democratic invasion.(NEACK, 2003:101)
The 2005 UN World Summit had accepted a doctrine of a “responsibility to protect” in its final Outcome Document, this doctrine proved more appealing to States than the earlier doctrine of humanitarian intervention had been. It is significant that the USA says very little on this issue in its 2006 National Security Strategy. Even though it has accepted that States without effective government pose a threat in the context of the war on terror, the USA in the 2006 National Security Strategy does not openly espouse the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” in cases of humanitarian crisis.
VI) The use of force against non-State actors and the 2006 Strategy
The focus on the war on terror in the 2006 Strategy necessarily raises the issue of the current state of the law on the use of force by and against non-State actors. The Strategy says that the need for action on WMD requires new approaches: both offences and defences are “necessary to deter State and non-State actors, through denial of the objectives of their attacks and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force”. In the 2006 Strategy, the USA and its allies in the war on terror make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor them, because they are equally guilty of murder. (THE WHITE HOUSE, 2006:22)
Conclusion
After 11 September 2001, the terrorist attacks have changed many things in the world. In this article, it has been aimed that what are the differences between 2002 and 2006 American National Security Documents. With Bush Era, USA has implemented “unilateral actions” policies than “co-operation” policies. In 2002 NSS Document, USA has declared “war on terrorism” to protect the security of the American people. George Bush said “it will be long-war”, and the time or eight years administration, justified him. Because so-called “Bush Doctrine” brought the world, only “war, terrorism and security anxieties”. In other words, with 2002 NSS, the world has seen “pre-emptive strike doctrine, Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, rogue states term etc”
The 2006 NSS in a way largely recognition the 2002 NSS and repeatedly refers back to its provisions on the use of force and other topics as I mentioned above. When 2006 NSS Document was declared, USA priorities focused on “Iran and Syria” as sponsorship of terrorism. Especially Irak was identified as a terrorist state that it the Iranian regime sponsors terrorism and also threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; At the same time disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom.
Finally, In George W. Bush’s eight years administration, both USA and the world face new threats and new problems. But namely, we have seen and tested that the world would be different than the cold war period.
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‘NATO has become an “Alliance for the USA?” : NATO’s Enlargement and the USA Mart 8, 2009
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‘NATO has become an “Alliance for the USA?” : NATO’s Enlargement and the USA
The Post-Cold War, NATO’s position turned into as a “controversial case” within its existence. Many scholars, policy-makers and journalists have discussed and asked this question themselves: “What will happen about NATO’s existence from now on?”
Before the answering this question, we must handle the subject (or question) from NATO’s evolution perspective. By this way, we can both answer the first question and think about the new problematic whether has “NATO become an alliance for USA?”: NATO’s Enlargement and the USA.
Introduction
The North Atlantic Organization (NATO) has saved its existence in Post-Cold War Era. The Warsaw Treaty, which was founded against NATO in 1955, was dissolved in 1991. But NATO continued to its existence. At the same time, it has been going to its enlargement for 17 years. NATO not only has been expanding but also it has been transforming itself to new adapt to new circumstances and conditions in international area.
The Soviet Union, which was collapsed in 1991, was enemy of USA during the Cold War Era. After 1991, The Soviet Union lost its control on Central and Eastern Europe. The Communist ideology would no longer rule on these countries again.
The successor states, which remained from Soviet Union, weren’t powerful as much as Soviet Union. Also they weren’t hostile towards NATO. On the other hand Russia had a lot of problems 1990s such as economic, politics, social and internal problems. It needed all the help it could get from the West, as well as Soviet Union’s successor states.
The Post-Cold War Eras has started with new events. “A new geopolitical world-order” as we call it has begun. It could be called “American geopolitical world-order” In other words USA has started to use its economic, politics and military power since 1990. NATO has come into prominence as a military instrument for USA in 1990s. Now, we will search the answer for question: What does it mean NATO’s Enlargement in Post- Cold War Era.
The Debates on NATO’s Future
When the people were thinking about NATO that it would remain at Cold War Era and would dissolved rapidly, the events showed us the opposite realities. While the international community was imagining that Europe would be safer than past and Europe Security would established around the Organization (then Conference) for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Contrary to this, NATO has found itself in a new process of action. It meant “enlargement”.
In Yugoslavia, after the dissolution of Warsaw Pact, there was a threat for NATO as a consequence of violence and instability. Besides that Russia became a huge problem since the beginning of 1990s. Because Russia was a nuclear power, torn by internal instability, its economic was ruined etc. When NATO didn’t perceive Russia as a threat no longer about its military power, On the contrary, Central and Eastern Europe countries perceived Russia due to its historical desires and past experiences. Therefore these countries wanted and needed security guarantees from NATO, as full members of the Alliance, as a guarantee toward a possible Russian neo-imperialism.
The debate on “enlargement”, between the West and USA, was caused a lot of problems. One of them, “enlargement” would only antagonize Russia that Russian neo-imperialism would improve if NATO went to East and expand against the Russia.
The end of the debates, NATO policy-makers decided that the new era brings with itself new challenges which demand the new missions, but NATO has every reason to continue its existence. Later this sentence became a mainstream opinion and doctrine of NATO.
Challenges to the Enlargement – Influence of the European Unification and Balkan Wars
In NATO, the biggest problem was relationship with between USA and France and some degree Germany. The enemy that was the cause of founding the Alliance and its survival during the four decades of the Cold War was gone.
Changing geostrategic priorities also indentified NATO’s complete transformation, which started at the end of the geopolitical transition, as a reaction to the beginning of new era in international relations and a new geopolitical world-order. Transformation was used to improve NATO’s ability. NATO’s countries carried out transformation so as to prepare NATO in new era.
Transformation of NATO as a main goal of the Alliance can be found in all the official documents from the Summit 1991 of Rome to Summit 2006 of Riga. The enlargement was one of the elements of transformation of NATO itself and it is also one of the main geopolitical and geostrategic objectives of NATO. But before the enlargement could start, NATO had to show that it was capable to function in the new geostrategic relations and that it was able to shape the new security architecture in Europe and its border regions.
The influence of wars in the Balkans was important for NATO’s enlargement process. War in Yugoslavia meant that it was perceived renewal of old, medieval conflict and hatred which reformed of geopolitical situation and balance of power in Europe again.
Presumption that the war and cruelty were something that was natural for the Balkans influenced the USA and the West in a sense that they didn’t want to get involved in war. In 1995 at Bosnian War, NATO played important role in there. Bosnia was stabilized after Croatian victories and weak interventions of NATO which allowed the genocide in Srebrenica to occur. In 1999 NATO’s intervention against Serbia in 1999 finally showed that NATO actually was dominants as one of the pillars of European security.
Geopolitical and Military Predominance of USA and Its Influence on NATO’s Enlargement
The beginning of Post-Cold War Era, USA has occurred as a superpower in the world. In other words, a completely new geostrategic relation has begun. As a new and sole superpower, USA has never thought NATO’s dissolution.
The Administration of President Bush senior decided that NATO would continue to be actively involved in the Europe Affairs. So USA’s existence would continue in Europe. Since the beginning and especially from the middle of the nineties, appeals for the downsizing of US presence in Europe and more substantial involvement of Europeans in the projection of power started. That is also meant transferring the burden of responsibility on Europe.
All the key decisions which made even the debate about the possible enlargement possible, and the decisions that brought the first round of enlargement into being were made during the Clinton administration and were the result of the President’s will.
The second round of the enlargement was simply a next logical step, like the third round of enlargement that started at the NATO Summit in Bucharest with invitations to Croatia and Albania to join the Alliance is the present logical step. The process is more and more becoming a sort of routine. But the first round and the initiative that came from the administration of the USA at that time were a factor that broke the deadlock and changed NATO from a Cold War military alliance toward a Post-Cold War security community.
During the nineties, NATO was in fully crisis and debates due to changing and strategy confusion. The USA as the only power, which is capable of projecting and exerting strategic power, gave its allies the opportunity to enjoy these benefits without the real burden sharing.
The Use of NATO as a mechanism for the defense of Western interests was planned so that US allies would start to prepare for their projection of military power. It was planned so that NATO would become capable for the exertion of power in the regions that were not in the reach of the Alliance for.
To sum up, the situation hasn’t changed over the years. Since the USA gave about 90 percent of coalition troops in both Iraqi wars in 1991 and 2003. We can conclude that USA military predominance and European lack of capability to follow the USA in military spending and development continue to be a constant fact of transatlantic relations.
What is the NATO Today by Its Definition
NATO is, by its definition a political and military alliance, based on the collective defense of its members. It protects its members and their security in the transatlantic area. It has precisely defined the geographical area of its responsibility, which is written in the North Atlantic Treaty. But NATO in its new, out-of-area missions went out of the transatlantic area, and it conducts missions outside the territories of its members.
If we define NATO as an organization of indivisible Western, liberal and post nationalistic interstate community, the following objections could be raised:
- NATO is a regional organization. Liberal, Western identity is universal, but NATO, like the EU, has in its documents a defined territorial reach and area of responsibility, and will not enlarge over the defined borders. NATO does not want to become a unified liberal or Western community, since it is not its meaning or intention of its member states
- Regional identity is a second objection. NATO, besides European, includes the Anglo-American states – the USA and Canada, and the North Atlantic Ocean, and it represents the enlarged European i.e. Euroatlantic liberal community, and not the international community at large. NATO is the organization of European security, established with a purpose to defend Europe from Soviet threat. NATO is the main security organization of liberal Europe. The area that is included in the North Atlantic Treaty is the North Atlantic Ocean.
- NATO is based on liberal norms and multilateralism, and it represents a typical interstate organization which functions on the principles of negotiating and agreements that leave the sovereignty of member states almost intact, so it is not a unified community;
4) Religious culture is the fourth objective, since NATO and the EU have their origins in the states whose societies belong to Western Christianity. Although there is a difference between Western and Eastern Christianity in Europe, and of course between Christianity and Islam, these lines of division are today not key factors of division in Europe, because NATO and the EU have, through their enlargements, overcome these dividing lines.
The Real Character of NATO: A Tool for Fulfillment of Geopolitical Objectives of the USA or A Security
By enlarging its territorial reach, and going “out-of-area” to the areas that are considered strategically important and that represent territories where security threats come from, NATO has fulfilled the geopolitical and geostrategic objectives of the USA and of some of its other members.
If we want to understand NATO’s persistence after the Cold War, we must turn to international institutionalism theories to explain why, contrary to neorealist expectations, NATO remains the key international security institution for its members.
Here we have to draw the line between NATO before and after September 11. We also have to draw the line between American global policies, whose goal of global leadership has become a pursuit for global hegemony with direct territorial control of strategically important areas, where the oil reserves are located, have started to fulfill after George W. Bush became President of the USA, and especially after September 11, in a sense that was unprecedented until then. The ways of fulfilling these goals have changed. They have become much more militaristic.
The degree of how much the USA is willing to go in fulfilling these goals has also changed, at the same time destroying the fragile stability of the Middle East. We also have to draw a distinction between justifiability of the intervention in Afghanistan and in Iraq, since the intervention in Iraq probably had nothing to do with the struggle against terrorism. NATO’s different views about these operations were shown in the inability to make decision by consensus and participate in the attack on Iraq in 2003, which was not the case with Afghanistan, where NATO is leading the ISAF, a stabilization force in Afghanistan.
However, we can say that commitments that were taken in Afghanistan and Iraq (by training Iraqi forces) are a result of a new consensus in NATO, which includes the shift of NATO’s area of interest and shift in NATO’s missions outside of Europe. It commits NATO to the development of capabilities, especially strategic, to be able to fulfill these kinds of missions.
The USA, with couple of its real allies would have a possibility to wage real war when they wanted, and NATO would provide peace making and peace keeping forces and send them to missions outside of Europe. The European Union would be responsible for police forces and society building after a conflict would end and the country was stabilized. A better way would be a balanced responsibility and burden sharing for global security.
After September 11, and especially after the Iraq intervention, and all the problems in transatlantic relations and division among the NATO members it has caused, we can say that NATO has again, for the second time after the Cold War, changed itself. Only the formal structure remains the same. Besides including ten new members, huge changes also happened in the internal relations among the allies, in NATO’s objectives and missions. The characteristics of this new NATO are now: strong American unipolarism and the pursuing of geopolitical and geostrategic goals outside of NATO, the struggle against terrorism by military means and interventions, deteriorated relations between some of the allies.
After the Istanbul summit, held in 2004, relations between the two sides of the Atlantic have improved, and the USA also realized that it could not follow a completely unipolar policy. The European allies realized that they have to improve their own relations, and not base them on their relation towards American global policy. The situation during the Iraqi crisis, when NATO’s functioning was blocked, was one of the results of American unipolar policies. NATO was for a long time considered the most important alliance where the USA participate, and its unity and strength were really weakened and tested because of the transatlantic division over Iraq. The international action that the USA started, through efforts on making an international coalition, ended in a fiasco. American power was at its peak, and its political and moral authority at the bottom. This great division in transatlantic relations threatened to make NATO unimportant, and maybe even redundant, because it would lose its ability to act and the meaning of its existence.
NATO must not allow itself to become a simple tool for the realization of geopolitical and geostrategic objectives of any state, not even the USA. By becoming a simple tool, NATO would ruin its legitimacy, which could never be restored. If NATO, as an alliance, went for military occupation of Iraq, together with the USA and some of the NATO members, it would have posed an irreversible step towards becoming a sort of “supermarket” of the USA, which would use it for fulfilling its geopolitical and geostrategic objectives. Even in the current situation, NATO permanently suffers from the perception that it is used as a mechanism, which serves for the recovery and stabilization of the states that the USA attack, and occupy.
If the USA wants to change the ways they address the security challenges and respond to those challenges differently, Washington has to express its support to the strong, unified and pro-Atlantic Europe, and abandon its policy of dividing the Europe on the Old and New Europe, as former American defense minister Rumsfeld called the two groups of states of Europe.
If Washington wants Europe to take more responsibility for security, it has to start treating Europe as unified. That kind of Europe could take a real responsibility. The lesson that everybody has to take from the crisis in transatlantic relations is that every attempt of building a unified Europe on the basis of anti-Americanism leads to the division of Europe. American power is a possibility, and not a problem, so it should be used in the right way.
Europe has to address the problems of current multilateral institutions in a realistic manner. USA unilateralism and coalitions of the willing are not the answer. But those Europeans, who insist on the use of the United Nations, at the time when this institution is not capable to fulfill its missions, are also not realistic. In reality, there is a huge disproportion between the problems in the World and the capability of international institutions to resolve them. Therefore, both sides of the Atlantic have to find new solutions, either through building new institutions or through radical reform of the existing ones.
Conclusion
To sum up, NATO’s enlargement has a lot of problems. The key problem for NATO in the future will be defining its role and position in transatlantic relations, and a challenge that it could become a tool for fulfilling the American geopolitical and geostrategic objectives. If NATO faces this challenge, it must resist the possibility to operate militarily in the interest of the USA, which is mainly oriented towards gaining and keeping control of oil and gas reserves, pipelines and strategic maritime locations.
NATO must not also allow itself to become a tool that will be used for operations of cleaning and stabilization of states that were the objects of the US military interventions. The lesson of the crisis in relations between the USA and Europe is that the USA and Europe need each other, and NATO is the only institution in military and security field, where representatives of both sides participate and make decisions by reaching a consensus. Therefore, NATO is a necessity. It should not be a NATO as current American official policy would like it to be, but the NATO where the USA and Europe would treat each other as equal partners.
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